Abstract. Blind digital signatures were introduced by Chaum. In this paper, we show h o w security and blindness properties for blind digital signatures, can be simultaneously de ned and satis ed, assuming an arbitrary one-way trapdoor permutation family. T h us, this paper presents the rst complexity-based proof of security for blind signatures.
Introduction
A digital signature scheme allows one to sign" documents in such a w a y that everyone can verify the validity of authentic signatures, but no one can forge signatures of new documents. The strongest de nition of security for a digital signature scheme was put forth by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest 15 . Several schemes, based on both speci c and general complexity assumptions, were subsequently shown to satisfy this strongest de nition. A variation on basic digital signatures, known as blind digital signatures, w as proposed by Chaum. Blind digital signature schemes include the additional requirement that a signer can sign" a document which i s g i v en to him in some encrypted" form without knowing what the document contains. Blind digital signatures play a central role in anonymous electronic cash applications. In this paper, we show h o w security and blindness properties in digital signatures can be simultaneously de ned and satis ed, assuming an arbitrary one-way trapdoor permutation family. While our construction achieves the strongest guarantees under general complexity assumptions and runs in polynomial time in all the parameters, it is quite complicated and ine cient. The contribution of this paper is therefore twofold: 1 we show that the notions of blindness and security can be simultaneously formalized and 2 we exhibit a constructive proof of existence" of a blind digital signature scheme which satis es these strong requirements. The current paper leaves open the question of an e cient implementation. We stress, though, that it was previously not clear whether the strong security guarantees for blind digital signatures could be satis ed under any complexity assumptions.
We preface de nitions and our main result with some background.
Digital Signatures: Informally, a signature scheme allows a user with a public key and a corresponding private key to sign a document i n s u c h a w a y that everyone can verify the signature of the document using her public key but no one else can forge the signature of another document. Digital signatures were originally de ned by Di e and Hellman 9 , and the rst implementation w as based on the RSA trapdoor function 23 . Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest 15 de ned the strongest known existential adaptive c hosen-message attack" against digital signature schemes. They also demonstrated the rst scheme which is secure against such an attack 4 assuming the existence of claw-free permutations, which in turn may be based on the hardness of factoring. Subsequently, signatures secure against existential adaptive c hosen-message attacks were shown assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations 2 , one-way permutations 19 , and general one-way functions 24 . More e cient s c hemes secure against such an attack were shown in 8 , and schemes with additional properties were considered in 11, 3 , 1 6 .
Blind Signatures: Chaum 6 proposed the notion of blind digital signatures" a s a k ey tool for constructing various anonymous electronic cash instruments. These are instruments for which the bank cannot trace where and hence for what purpose a user spends her electronic currency. In this paper we do not address the broad issues of electronic commerce, but concentrate our attention solely on blind signatures. Informally, a blind digital signature scheme may be thought of as an abstract game between a user" and a bank". The user has a secret document for which she needs to get the signature from the bank. She should be able to obtain this signature without revealing to the bank anything about her document except its length. On the other hand, the security of the signature scheme should guarantee that it is di cult for the user to forge a signature of any additional document, even after getting from the bank a number of blind signatures. Blind untraceable signatures have attracted considerable attention in the literature see, for example, 7, 20, 1, 22 and references therein, and are used in several proposed electronic digital cash systems. Researchers use two di erent approaches for proving the security of signature schemes: complexitybased proofs of security 9 , 15, 2, 19, 24, 3 , 1 6 , 8 and random-oracle model proofs of security 10, 4, 21, 22 . Let us elaborate on these two notions of security:
Two Notions of Security for Digital Signatures:
Complexity-based proofs: The complexity-based approach w as put forth
by Di e and Hellman 9 . They suggested that the security of a cryptographic primitive could be reduced to a hardness assumptions of certain fundamental problems, such as the existence of one-way functions. The approach proved very successful, as a large number of cryptographic primitives, including pseudo-random generators, signatures and secure protocols were shown to exist based on general complexity assumptions.
Proofs based on random oracle model: In the case when complexitybased proofs seem to be di cult to attain, the approach used, for example in 10, 4, 21, 22 , is to assume that a cryptographic primitive such a s D E S or MD5 behaves like a truly random function. The security of the scheme is then shown under the assumption that the underlying primitive behaves in a near ideal fashion. Such proofs are weaker than complexity-based proofs. For a related discussion see 5 . Clearly, the complexity-based proofs of security are preferable to random-oracle model proofs of security. U n til now, however, the only proofs of security for blind digital signature schemes have been in the random oracle model. This paper presents the rst blind signature scheme with complexity-based proof of security.
Pointcheval and Stern 22 address the security of several blind digital signatures schemes, including blind variants of the Okamoto 20 , Schnorr 25 , and Guillou-Quisquater 17 signature schemes. In particular, 22 proves the security o f O k amoto-Schnorr and Okamoto-Guillou-Quisquater blind signatures in the random oracle model. Thus, Pointcheval and Stern consider blind signatures which rely on number-theoretic assumptions and show proofs of security only in the random-oracle model. In addition, their security proofs, while polynomial in the size of the cryptographic keys, are exponential in the number of blind digital signatures obtained before the break i.e. if the number of signatures that are required before the break is greater than logarithmic, then the reduction is not polynomial. The authors pose as an open problem the question of whether one can achieve a s c heme where the security of the reduction can be made polynomial both in the number of signatures obtained by the adversary before the break and in the size of the keys.
Our Result: In the next section, we formally de ne the notion of security o f a blind digital signature scheme. Informally, a blind digital signature scheme is secure if it satis es both a blindness and a non-forgeability property. The blindness property w as formulated in the original paper of Chaum 6 , and nonforgeability w as considered in the paper of Pointeval and Stern 22 where it is called called one more" forgery. Again, informally, see the next section for formal de nitions blindness means that a signer can not distinguish, except with negligible probability, the order in which she issued signatures, and nonforgeability means that after getting`signatures, it is infeasible for the receiver to compute`+ 1 signatures. We consider a non-forgeability requirement where the forger is allowed to run many parallel protocol executions for many blind signatures, in an arbitrarily interleaved and adaptive fashion, and to abort many such executions in the middle of the protocol, without having to count them as signatures. We call such an attack a n adaptive interleaved chosen-message attack. W e demonstrate a blind digital signature scheme which is secure against this attack, and which can be implemented based on any one-way trapdoor permutation.
MAIN THEOREM: Assume that one-way trapdoor permutations exist. Then there exists polynomial-time blind digital signature scheme, secure against an adaptive interleaved chosen-message attack.
Our scheme has both advantages and disadvantages. We list them below.
Advantages:
We give the rst complexity-theoretic proof of security for blind digital signatures; our scheme is shown to be secure against the adaptive i n terleaved chosen-message attack. All previous proofs of security for blind digital signatures were in the random-oracle model only and were not fully polynomial. We show h o w t o a c hieve our protocol based on any one-way trapdoor permutation. All previous blind digital signatures schemes were based on numbertheoretic assumptions only. Our scheme and proof of security are fully polynomial in all suitable parameters, including the number of blind signatures requested before the break. We t h us resolve in the a rmative the open question posed by P ointcheval and Stern 22 .
Disadvantages:
Our scheme, while polynomial in all suitable parameters, is ine cient. Thus, it should be viewed merely as a proof of existence which should pave the way for e cient future implementations.
Organization of the Paper: The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the de nitions of blindness and security t o b e used in this paper. We discuss some of the complications and solutions involved in constructing a blind signature scheme in section 3. We present our blind signature scheme in section 4 and sketch a proof of its security in section 5. We conclude in section 6 with a brief discussion of the signi cance of our result to the area of anonymous electronic cash.
De nitions
In the proof and the construction of blind digital signatures, we will use the security of standard digital signatures, as de ned by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest 15 . Hence, before we give the de nition of blind digital signatures, we remind the reader of the standard signature de nitions.
Signature schemes: The standard signature scheme is a triple of algorithms, Gen,Sign,Verify, where Gen1 k i s a p robabilistic polynomial time key-generation algorithm, which takes as an input a security p a rameter 1 k and outputs a pair pk; sk of public and secret keys. The signing algorithm Signpk; sk; m is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which takes as an input a public key pk a secret key sk a message m to be signed and outputs a signature of a message m as well as a new i.e., updated secret key sk 0 . In a memoryless signature scheme, the secret key sk stays the same throughout. A veri cation algorithm Verifyp k ; m ; m is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm which takes as an input a public key pk a message m and a purported signature m and outputs accept reject. W e require, of course, that for all signatures computed by rst executing a key generation algorithm and then signing a sequence of messages according to the above process, the veri cation algorithm always output accept.
As mentioned above, security against the existential adaptive c hosen-message attack of Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest is the strongest known security measure for signatures 15 . Security of Signature Schemes: In this attack, an adversary A, which is a probabilistic polynomial-time machine, is given a public key pk generated by the key-generation algorithm. The adversary A can request in an adaptive fashion a polynomial number of signatures of his choice. A must then produce a valid signature on a document for which he has not yet seen a signature. If he can produce any such document signature pair which is accepted by the veri cation algorithm, then the attack is successful. A signature scheme is de ned to be secure if for all constants c, and for all probabilistic polynomial-time A, there exists a security p a rameter k c;A such that for all k k c;A the probability taken over coin-ips of the adversary that A is successful is less then 1=k c . We shall use the term polynomially bounded in this paper to refer to a quantity which is polynomial in the security parameter. Similarly, w e shall denote by 1=poly the inverse of a polynomially bounded quantity.
We are now ready to give a formal de nition of a blind signature scheme and its security. In the de nition below, digital signatures are treated as an interactive protocols between two players: a Signer who blindly" signs a document m and the User who obtains the signature of her document m. We rely on the formalism of Interactive T uring machines, de ned by Goldwasser, Micali and Racko 13 . The security of a blind digital signature consists of two requirements: the blindness property and the non-forgeability of additional signatures. We s a y the blind digital signature scheme is secure if it satis es both properties, as dened below. We remark that our non-forgeability de nition follows the de nition of one-more" forgery by P ointcheval and Stern 22 Blind Digital Signatures: A blind digital signature scheme is a four-tuple, consisting of two Interactive Turing machines Signer,User and two algorithms Gen,Verify. Gen1 k is a probabilistic polynomial time key-generation algorithm which takes as an input a security p a rameter 1 k and outputs a pair pk; sk of public and secret keys. The Signerpk,sk and Userpk,m are a pair of polynomiallybounded probabilistic Interactive Turing machines, where both machines have the following separate tapes: read-only input tape, write-only output tape, a read write work tape, a read-only random tape, and two communication tapes, a read-only and a write-only tape. They are both given on their input tapes as a common input a pk produced by a k ey generation algorithm. Additionally, the Signer is given on her input tape a corresponding secret key sk and the User is given on her input tape a message m, where the length of all inputs must be polynomial in the security parameter 1 k of the key generation algorithm. The User and Signer engage in the interactive protocol of some polynomial in the security p a rameter number of rounds. At the end of this protocol the Signer outputs either completed or not-completed and the User outputs either fail or m. The Verifyp k ; m ; m is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm, which outputs accept reject with the requirement that for any message m, and for all random choices of key generation algorithm, if both Signer and User follow the protocol then the Signer always outputs completed, and the output of the user is always accepted by the veri cation algorithm.
We n o w describe the security of blind signatures.
The Security of Blind Digital Signature: a blind digital signature scheme is secure if for all constants c, and for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A, there exists a security p a rameter k c;A such that for all k k c;A the following two considerations hold:
Blindness property: Let b 2 R f0; 1g i.e. b is a random bit which is kept secret from A. A executes the following experiment where A controls the signer", but not the user", and tries to predict b:
Step 1: pk; sk Gen1 k
Step 2: fm 0 ; m 1 g A 1 k ; p k ; s k i.e. A produces two documents, polynomial in 1 k , where fm 0 ; m 1 g a re by convention lexicographically ordered and may even depend on pk and sk.
Step Step We remark that we do not insist that this happens, and either one or both users may output fail
Step 5: A outputs a bitb given her view of steps 1 through 3, and if conditions are satis ed of step 4 as well.
Then the probability, taken over the choice of b, over coin-ips of key-generation algorithm, the coin-ips of A, and private coin-ips of both users from step 3, thatb = b is at most 1 2 + 1 k c .
Non-forgeability property: A executes the following experiment where A controls the user ", but not the signer", and tries to get one-more" signature:
Step 2: Apk engages in polynomially many in k adaptive, parallel and arbitrarily interleaved interactive protocols with polynomially many copies of Signerpk; sk, where A decides in an adaptive fashion when to stop. Letd enote the number of executions, where the Signer outputted completed in the end of Step 2.
Step 3: A outputs a collection fm 1 ; m 1 ; : : : m j ; m j subject to the constraint the all m i ; m i for 1 i j are all accepted by Verifypk; m i ; m i .
Then the probability, taken over coin-ips of key-generation algorithm, the coinips of A, and over the private coin-ips of the Signer, that j ìs at most 
Remarks on Blindness Property:
We stress that we do not require the adversary to follow the signing protocol, nor do we require the protocol to terminate with the valid signature. Moreover, we require that the probability bound holds even if the protocol is aborted in the middle of execution. By standard hybrid arguments, the above de nition is as general as the de nition in which polynomially many signatures are obtained and then recalled, leaving A to distinguish between the last two signatures. Finally, w e note that since the User does not have a n y special ID or other special identi cation or else embeds such information in the message to be signed, we restrict our view to a single user program.
Towards Our Scheme
As mentioned in the introduction, our scheme is somewhat complicated. Instead of presenting it immediately, w e shall o er a sequence of re nements which i n the end yields a correct scheme. Our aim is twofold: 1 to explain why the complications in our the scheme are necessary and 2 to elaborate on the subtleties of the problem, even when using general completeness results.
Basic Ingredients: The two basic ingredients we start with are the secure signature scheme of Naor-Yung 19 , and the two-party completeness theorem of Yao and Goldreich, Micali and Widgerson 26, 1 4 . Let us brie y recall both ingredients.
The signature scheme of Naor-Yung is secure against existential adaptive chosen-message attack and can be built based on any one-way permutation f 19 w e remark that we do not need the result of 24 which is based on weaker assumptions since other tools in our protocol require one-way permutations anyway.
The two-party completeness theorem of Yao and Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson 26, 1 4 basically says that for any t w o parties A, and B, where A is given a secret input x and B is given a secret input y, and for any polynomial-time computable function g; there exists a protocol for computing gx; y such that nothing except the output of the function is revealed to the players. Moreover, the schemes could be easily extended to require that only one player learns gx; y, while for the other player learns nothing i.e. all interactions are computationally indistinguishable. Furthermore, the value of gx; y can be learned by one of the players only as the last message of the protocol, with the condition that if the protocol is aborted before this last message, then again no information is revealed i.e. all interactions are computationally indistinguishable. In fact, we use a stronger de nition, used by 26, 1 4 : that there exists a polynomial-time simulator which can simulate the views of the players, even in the case of Byzantine i.e. malicious faults. For details see the above references. Furthermore, the two-party protocol can be augmented to leave part of the input of one of the players unspeci ed, and allow this player to set this value in an arbitrary fashion during the actual protocol execution.
A rst simple idea would be to use these two general theorems in order to construct blind signatures in the following way: instead of having the User request that the Signer sign the message in the clear, engage in the two-party private protocol, at the end of which the User learns the signature of the document, and the Signer learns nothing. This solution" su ers from several problems, which we n o w elaborate upon.
Problem 1: The scheme of Naor-Yung is not memoryless", and future signatures reveal previous signatures, which violates the blindness property.
Solution to Problem 1: Goldreich 11 showed how t o m a k e a n y signature scheme including the signature scheme of Naor and Yung memoryless" 11 , using pseudo-random functions of 12 . In our setting, the key-generation algorithm can add to the secret key a seed s for pseudo-random function and add to a public key a commitment 18 of this seed. Then, during secure two-party computation, the Signer must generate all of her random choices and a random tree of 19, 1 1 using an agreed-upon pseudo-random function with the committed seed.
Problem 2: Let us take a closer look at the proof of security of Naor-Yung scheme 19 . Their scheme takes as its basis a tree; messages are inserted in the leaves of this tree, and a signature involves the construction of a path from the root of the tree to the appropriate leaf. Naor and Yung show that if there exists a F orger that can replace the User and forge the signature of a new document, then this Forger can be used as a subroutine to invert a one-way permutation on a random input in this tree. The key idea of their proof is to replace the Signer with an Inverter which is able to set a trap" in this tree as follows: in order to forge a signature, the Forger must diverge from the path of previous signatures in the tree see, for example, 19, 11, 8 , and if the Inverter can guess where in the path this divergence takes place which she can do with 1=poly probability then it can place an output of a one-way permutation at this point and force the forger to invert. The problem is that for this proof to work, the Inverter must know all the previous signatures, in order to know where to set a trap". But the knowledge of previous signatures on the part of the Signer is exactly what blind signatures are trying to prevent! These would seem to be contradictory requirements.
Solution to Problem 2: Since the Inverter is deployed in a simulation of the signature process, the Inverter is allowed to reset" the Forger. So how can we assure that the Signer who can not reset" does not know which documents she signs while the Inverter which is allowed to reset" has full information? The idea is to use a variant of a proof of knowledge procedure. The User rst commits to a random string r and to her message exclusive-ored with r. The Signer requests to see the decommitment of either one or the other commitment but not both. The Inverter will be able to retrieve the message by rst requesting to see one commitment, then resetting the state of the Forger, and then requesting to see the other commitment. We call such a commitment a n extractable commitment.
We should point out that since both commitments and their decommitments are now part of the input public and private of the secure two-party completeness protocol, they are included in the execution of the two-party completeness protocol and hence force correct behavior of both players see 26, 1 4 .
Problem 3: In the scheme of 11 for rendering the signature scheme memoryless, it was not necessary for the Signer to prove that she is only using coin-ips that come from a pseudo-random function. In order to achieve the blindness property, h o w ever, we m ust insist that this is always the case. This is done through use of the completeness theorem in conjunction with a published commitment of the pseudo-random seed S, a s w e shall see. The memoryless property of the signature guarantees that the Signer can not mark" the signatures in any w a y , an absolutely necessary property for blind signatures! In the proof of security, though i.e., when dealing with a forger the Inverter must be able to replace a pseudo-random string by a trap". This trap is a completely random input on which the forger will invert with 1=poly probability. Again, these would seem to be contradictory requirements, since if the Signer can insert new random bits into the singing process, then it can mark" the signature and violate blindness property.
Solution to Problem 3: Again, the ability of the Inverter to reset" the Forger is vital to the resolution of the above somewhat paradoxical issue. The idea is again to have the Signer commit in an extractable form see above to some poly-long string X. The Signer picks a secret input Y of the same length as X; both X and Y are used as private inputs for the secure protocol guaranteed by the two-party completeness theorem. We modify our secure function evaluation protocol to allow the Signer to deviate from the above pseudo-random choices and insert other inputs, but only in case when X = Y . I f X 6 = Y w e demand that the Signer follow the protocol as before. The chances that the Signer can correctly guess" X are negligible, so the signature scheme remains blind with overwhelming probability. On the other hand, the Inverter, by resetting the Forger, can nd out what X is, set her guess Y to the same value, and then set a trap.
Problem 4: Since the de nition of the non-forgeability property allows the Inverter to run many parallel sessions interleaved in an arbitrary fashion, we must be assured that it can insert a trap" on which the Forger will invert during forging of a one-more signature" in a consistent manner in all the runs. The Inverter must therefore be able to specify a point in the exposed sub-tree of signatures see 19, 11 at which to insert her trap. But how can this be consistently speci ed, not knowing the order or the interleaving nature of the adversary?
Solution to Problem 4: The solution is as follows: if X = Y the Signer Inverter can insert arbitrary values at an arbitrary point i.e. it does not commit where to insert the trap and thus can consistently do so during parallel interleaving sessions in the same fashion as before, i.e. consistently at some point i n an exposed sub-tree of signatures see 19, 11 We n o w give details how this can be done.
Recall that we use a secure computation protocol in such a w a y that the User Forger receives no information about the signature prior to the last round from the signer. We refer to this as the atomic signature property. Recall that the Forger may request at most a polynomial number of signatures, say pk, before producing her forgery. The Inverter therefore chooses a number r uniformly at random from 1; p k . This speci es the interaction with the Forger in which she will try to plant her trap. The Inverter also chooses a height a of a tree uniformly at random at which to plant her trap. The Inverter speci es in interaction r that trap w will be planted at height a. Once the message m in interaction r has been speci ed, the Inverter may determine the node v in which she has chosen to plant her trap. With probability 1 =poly, the Inverter will have c hosen to plant her trap in such a w a y that no previously issued signature has yet made use of the node v; t h us planting of the trap will not invalidate signatures issued previous to interaction r. W e s a y in this case that the trap choice has been successful: the Inverter plants her trap with impunity. On the other hand, if the Inverter has chosen an address for her trap such that previous signatures would be invalidated, then we s a y that the trap choice has been unsuccessful.
In this case, the Inverter does not plant the trap in node v. By the atomic signature property, no information about signatures has been divulged to the User Forger in any other interaction. Therefore, the Inverter may continue to plant her trap in node v in a consistent fashion for all incomplete interactions. Since the simulation is successful with probability 1 =poly, a trap is planted as in Naor and Yung's scheme with probability 1 =poly. It follows that the Inverter causes the Forger to invert w with 1=poly probability. 4 The Blind Signature Scheme
We shall now assemble all of the above and describe our blind signature scheme. We shall denote by cz the secure commitment of a string z. W e shall denote by c z an extractable commitment o f z . Recall from above that such a commitment reveals nothing about z to the Signer, but enables an Inverter, by rewinding a F orger, to extract z.
The scheme works as follows. The Signer publishes cs, that is, a commitment of her secret pseudo-random key s, along with her public key pk, and the one-way permutation f used in the Naor and Yung 19 s c heme. Also made public are the pseudo-random generation function g, a s w ell as a set of public hash functions required by the scheme of Naor and Yung.
Each time a signature is to be issued, the Signer and User engage in a secure two-party computation. The User provides as input to the computation the message m to be signed, as well as a random string X. In addition, the User provides extractable commitments c X and c m. Through a variation on the standard secure two-party computation protocol, these two commitments are passed in the clear to the Signer. Recall that in the Inverter Forger scenario, these commitments enable the Inverter, by rewinding the Forger, to learn X and m, thereby e ectively circumventing the blindness of the scheme.
The Signer provides to the secure computation of 26, 14 her private information as well as information respecting the trap she may wish to plant when she plays the role of the Inverter. In particular, the Signer provides to the computation her secret signing key sk and her secret pseudorandom seed s. She also provides a string Y constituting her guess of X. Finally, the Signer provides to the computation a speci cation of the trap she wishes to have inserted. More precisely, the Signer speci es w, the value she wishes to have planted in the signature tree, and either a node v in a tree where she wishes to put w in case v is already known from other sessions or a boolean value indicating that in the current signature, on its way to the leaf, at height a in the tree at which trap w should be inserted.
The memoryless property 11 is incorporated into our our scheme as follows. The secure two-party computation protocol produces a choice of leaf in which to insert the message m; this is computed to be the output of the pseudorandom generation function g of 12 with secret seed s and index m truncated appropriately to yield a uniform selection of leaves. If the Signer's guess Y is successful, i.e., if Y = X, then the signer can deviate from g s m path and insert instead w a t a n o d e v as speci ed above. If the current signature does not use v, no trap is planted and g s m is followed. On successful completion of the protocol i.e., if cheating during secure computation was not detected the decodinbg of signature m with or without trap is sent to the User.
Security of our scheme
The blindness of the scheme follows from the properties of two-party secure computation of 26, 1 4 . The security of the computation is violated only when the guess Y of the Signer is correct, and consequently X = Y . This happens with negligible probability.
It now remains to be seen that if there exists a successful Forger for this scheme, then this Forger may be used by the Inverter in a polynomial-time algorithm Q capable of inverting the one-way permutation f on an arbitrary value with probability 1 =poly.
Since the Forger makes extractable commitments of X and m, the Forger can be used by the Inverter to rewind the protocol and extract X and m. B y setting X = Y which is indistinguishable for any polynomial-time F orger from the case X 6 = Y , the Inverter can now plant a trap in a consistent manner.
When signatures are issued sequentially, therefore, by making use of its knowledge of the history of issued signatures, the Inverter may set a "trap" in exactly the way that this was done in a memoryless analog of Naor and Yung's scheme. The ability of algorithm Q to invert f now follows from the security o f the memoryless version of Naor and Yung's memoryless analog 11, 19 . When signatures are issued over the course of multiple, interleaved executions of the blind signature protocol, the same "trap" may be planted consistently over many executions using the method described in Section 3 in response to Problem 4. Thus, the Inverter remains capable of inverting with probability 1 =poly even over interleaved protocol executions.
An early example of an electronic cash scheme of this sort is a paper by Chaum, Naor, and Fiat 7 . Their system has in fact been deployed with some additional apparatus in a real-world implementation. Here a coin assumes the form d; f 1=3 d, where f is a suitable hash function, such as MD5. Computations are performed in Z N for some product of primes N = pq, where N is published, and p and q are held in secret by the Signer the bank. A coin is issued as follows. The User generates the value d and a random blindness factor r, and sends the quantity r 3 fd to the Signer. The Signer computes rf 1=3 d, and sends it to the User. On dividing out r from this last quantity, the User computes f 1=3 d, and has therefore obtained a valid coin pair d; f 1=3 d. It is easy to see that the described scheme is blind. It is, in fact, blind in an information theoretic sense. The scheme would also appear at rst glance to be secure since, given d, it is hard to compute f 1=3 d, and vice versa. We wish to point out, however, that this rationale does not give a proof of security, and is in fact deceptive: there might nonetheless be some computationally feasible way of generating the pair of values constituting the coin simultaneously.
This and similar weaknesses appear to vex many implementations of anonymous digital cash. Although a proof of security of several blind digital signature schemes based on the random oracle model was given by P ointcheval and Stern 22 , the current paper gives the rst complexity-based proof for this important primitive. We h a v e therefore shown that secure anonymous digital cash is possible to achieve in a complexity-based sense, i.e. we h a v e shown that it may b e as secure as, say, factoring. As mentioned above, however, our protocol is inecient. Combining the requirements of e ciency and provable security to create a new blind digital signature scheme is an interesting open problem.
